








(paras. 37—59 of the Judgment)
It had been maintained by Denmark and the Netherlands that the Fede‑
ral Republic was in any event, and quite apart from the Geneva Conven‑
tion, bound to accept delimitation on an equidistance basis, since the use 
of that method was a rule of general or customary international law, auto‑
matically binding on the Federal Republic.
One argument advanced by them in support of this contention, which 
might be termed the a priori argument, started from the position that 
the rights of the coastal State to its continental shelf areas were based 
on its sovereignty over the land domain, of which the shelf area was 
the natural prolongation under the sea. From this notion of appurtenance 
was derived the view, which the Court accepted, that the coastal State’s 
rights existed ipso facto and ab initio. Denmark and the Netherlands 
claimed that the test of appurtenance must be «proximity»: all those 
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parts of the shelf being considered as appurtenant to a particular coastal 
State which were closer to it than they were to any point on the coast 
of another State. Hence, delimitation had to be effected by a method 
which would leave to each one of the States concerned all those areas 
that were nearest to its own coast. As only an equidistance line would 
do this, only such a line could be valid, it was contended.
This view had much force; the greater pan of a State’s continental shelf 
areas would normally in fact be nearer to its coasts than to any other. But 
the real issue was whether it followed that every part of the area concerned 
must be placed in that way. The Court did not consider this to follow from 
the notion of proximity, which was a somewhat fluid one. More fundamental 
was the concept of the continental shelf as being the natural prolongation 
of the land domain. Even if proximity might afford one of the tests to 
be applied, and an important one in the right conditions, it might not 
necessarily be the only, nor in all circumstances the most appropriate, one.
Submarine areas did not appertain to the coastal State merely because 
they were near it, nor did their appurtenance depend on any certainty 
of delimitation as to their boundaries. What conferred the ipso jure title 
was the fact that the submarine areas concerned might be deemed to be 
actually pan of its territory in the sense that they were a prolongation of 
its land territory under the sea. Equidistance clearly could not be identified 
with the notion of natural prolongation, since the use of the equidistance 
method would frequently cause areas which were the natural prolongation 
of the territory of one State to be attributed to another. Hence, the notion 
of equidistance was not an inescapable a priori accompaniment of basic 
continental shelf doctrine.
A review of the genesis of file equidistance method of delimitation 
confirmed the foregoing conclusion. The «Truman Proclamation» issued 
by the Government of the United States on 28 September 1945 could be 
regarded as a starting‑point of the positive law on the subject, and the chief 
doctrine it enunciated, that the coastal State had an original, natural and 
exclusive right to the continental shelf off its shores, had come to prevail 
over all others and was now reflected in the 1958 Geneva Convention. 
With regard to the delimitation of boundaries between the continental 
shelves of adjacent States, the Truman Proclamation had stated that 
212
such boundaries «shall be determined by the United States and the State 
concerned in accordance with equitable principles». These two concepts, 
of delimitation by mutual agreement and delimitation in accordance with 
equitable principles, had underlain all the subsequent history of the subject. 
It had been largely on the recommendation of a committee of experts 
that the principle of equidistance for the delimitation of continental shelf 
boundaries had been accepted by the United Nations International Law 
Commission in the text it had laid before the Geneva Conference of 
1958 on the Law of the Sea which had adopted the Continental Shelf 
Convention. It could legitimately be assumed that the experts had been 
actuated by considerations not of legal theory but of practical convenience 
and cartography. Moreover, the article adopted by the Commission had 
given priority to delimitation by agreement and had contained an exception 
in favour of «special circumstances».
The Court consequently considered that Denmark and the Netherlands 
inverted the true order of things and that, far from an equidistance rule 
having been generated by an antecedent principle of proximity inherent 
in the whole concept of continental shelf appurtenance, the latter was 
rather a rationalization of the former.
The Equidistance Principle   
Not a Rule of Customary International Law 
(paras. 60—82 of the Judgment)
The question remained whether through positive law processes 
the equidistance principle must now be regarded as a rule of customary 
international law.
Rejecting the contentions of Denmark and the Netherlands, the Court 
considered that the principle of equidistance, as it figured in Article 6 of 
the Geneva Convention, had not been proposed by the International Law 
Commission as an emerging rule of customary international law. This 
Article could not be said to have reflected or crystallized such a rule. 
This was confirmed by the fact that any State might make reservations 
in respect of Article 6, unlike Articles 1, 2 and 3, on signing, ratifying 
or acceding to the Convention.
